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with women's rights treaties need to look beyond the international and domestic levels of 
action to include the regional level in their analyses. 
I n recent years, the study of tmnsnational nonstate actors has established itself in the field of international relations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Tarrow 2005). This research provides 
a significant corrective to the neorealist and neoliberal assumption of state 
primacy in international politics. It also demonstmtes that transnational 
feminist networks are agenda setters in arenas such as the United Nations 
World Conferences. Yet, there is a disconnect between the literature on 
transnational actors and current directions in transnational organizing. 
Rather than primarily operating at the global level, many feminist 
transnational advocacy networks are mobilizing within world regions and 
are seeking to create, expand, and implement women's rights norms 
through regional institutions. The lack of research on the regional level 
has created a considerable imbalance in research on transnational activism. 
This article seeks to improve the scholarship on transnational women's 
rights advocacy by drawing attention to regional advocacy networks 
(RANs). One objective is to identify what regional advocacy networks are. 
We define RANs as a collection of individuals and organizations from the 
same world region working together toward a common goal. Distinct 
from global networks, RANs are more attuned to local constraints, such as 
lack of political will from domestic governments and accusations from 
local actors that women's rights activists represent "foreign" interests. Our 
second objective is to explore the conditions under which RANs are likely 
to achieve their goals. We argue that while global dynamics, such as the 
United Nations' growing recognition of women's rights as human rights, 
are foundational, more local dynamics are pivotal for RAN success. 
Drawing on the social movement concept of political opportunity 
structure, we suggest that RANs are likely to be influential when they 
build alliances with opinion leaders in states and institutions, when they 
have the ability to participate in the decision-making process, and when 
their goals overlap with the target institution's priorities. 
To demonstrate the importance of regional networks and understand the 
conditions under which they are influential, we present a case study of an 
African RAN that emerged in the late 1990s. Drawing from an analysis of 
primary sources and interviews with key participants, we explore a RAN's 
role in creating what is arguably the most progressive international treaty 
on women's rights, the African Union's (AU) Protocol to the Charter on 
Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Adopted 
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in 2003, the Protocol on the Rights of Women goes beyond instruments 
like the Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) by prohibiting female genital cutting, setting 
a minimum age of marriage at 18, and declaring that women have the 
right to contraception. The Protocol is also the first treaty in the world 
to guarantee a woman's right to abortion. Concerned with government 
failure to integrate international women's rights nonns and in response 
to domestic perceptions that women's rights are 'Western" impositions, 
women's rights activists and organizations from the African continent 
funned a network that accelerated the drafting process, helping to 
explain the timing of the Protocol's adoption, and expanded its content, 
helping to account for the Protocol's more radical provisions. The 
network's success depended on a combination of factors: the alliances 
the network funned with key African leaders, institutional change within 
the AU, and institutional priorities to promote gender equality. 
This analysis has important empirical and theoretical dimensions. 
Empirically, intraregional coalitions of women's rights activists are trying 
a new strategy of regionalizing global nonns in Africa, Europe, and Latin 
America. Theoretically, our emphasis on regional networks refines and 
extends existing constructivist research on transnational actors and the 
uptake of international nonns. We suggest that scholars seeking to 
understand the creation of women's rights commitments, the diffusion of 
women's rights nonns, and compliance with women's rights treaties 
need to look beyond the international and domestic levels of action and 
include the regional level in their analyses. 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY 
The transnational mobilization of activists - including women's rights 
activists - has captured the attention of many international relations 
scholars. In the 1990s, constructivists revived the study of transnational 
nonstate actors, showing that transnational networks can effect 
international and domestic change. 1 Subsequent cross-national statistical 
research further suggests that transnational actors help states adopt 
gender mainstreaming policies (True and Mintrom 2001). Transnational 
1. Constructivism is an approach in international relations that, in contrast to a neoutilitarian school of 
thought, emphasizes the social aspects of international politics. See Risse (2002). 
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networks have also been found to influence international politics. 
Transnational feminist groups, for example, helped put women's rights 
issues on the UN agenda (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; 
Joachim 2003). These works demonstrate the limitations of presenting 
states as solitary actors in world politics. 
Recognizing that the power of nonstate actors is not limitless, 
constructivists have also tried to identify how transnational networks 
influence states and international institutions. The boomerang model 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the spiral model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999) provide two elegant starting points. Both suggest that transnational 
advocacy networks help strengthen international human rights norms by 
persuading foreign governments and international organizations to 
sanction noncompliant governments. These models tackle limitations in 
sociological institutionalist work on the spread of a women's rights 
"world culture" (Berkovitch 1999) by specifying mechanisms of change. 
The evidence used to support the boomerang and spiral models' ideal-
typical portrayals, however, suggests that domestic human rights groups 
achieve change primarily by alerting audiences in the West. Examining 
only cases where Western audiences and actors were pivotal is problematic 
because non-Western transnational networks also influence state politics. 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink do allude to transnational nonstate 
actors working within world regions such as Latin America (1998, 79, 80, 
179-80), but the majority of research on transnational advocacy focuses 
on global or Western-driven movements (e.g., Tarrow 2005). Aili Tripp 
(2005) captures the problem well: 
The term "transnational feminism" is sometimes used as shorthand for 
Western involvement in and influence on feminist movements globally. 
This is only one element of hansnational linkages, and one that is 
increasingly diminishing in importance as movements in the South have 
begun to claim much of the momentum of feminist and women's rights 
organizing globally. 
Indeed, one study on the number and location of international 
nongovernmental organizations (INCOs) finds that the percentage of all 
INCOs in the world that are based in the global South increased from 
5% in 1953 to 23% in 1993 (Sikkink and Smith 2002). Scholars of 
transnational activism are beginning to study networks in the South, 
such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) 
and Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) (e.g., Moghadam 
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2005). Even in these works, the empirical and theoretical significance of 
regional networks is overlooked. 
Feminist scholars raise additional concerns about the representativeness, 
accountability, and efficacy of transnational advocacy networks. Many 
argue that power dynamics within transnational networks entail the 
exclusion of particular groups and class interests; transnational advocacy 
may represent only the viewpoints of middle-class intellectuals (Desai 
2005; Mendoza 2002). How "women's rights" are defined, accordingly, 
requires dissection to understand whose voices are included and whose 
are excluded (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Hesford and Kozol 2005). An 
additional concern is that transnational activism can lead to unforeseen 
backlash and complications, a point that we return to in the next section. 
Last, feminist scholars note that there are trade-offs between mobilizing 
at the local, grassroots level and mobilizing through transnational, 
professionalized NGOs (Alvarez 1999). The regional character of more 
recent feminist movements, however, has not been adequately 
considered. In sum, research on transnationalism by both international 
relations and feminist scholars has overlooked the regional level. 
A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY 
To improve the study of transnational women's rights networks, we call 
attention to the rise of regional advocacy networks (RANs), a particular 
kind of transnational advocacy network (TAN). TANs, as defined by Keck 
and Sikkink (1998, 2), are composed of "relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, 
a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services." 
We define regional advocacy networks as a collection of individuals and 
organizations from the same world region working together toward a 
common goal. Like TANs, RANs may include international and 
domestic NGOs, social movements, and individuals in intergovernmental 
organizations and national governments. 
Emphasizing that many transnational networks are in actuality regional 
networks is not trivial. While the inclusion of women's rights issues in 
the UN's agenda may help legitimize women's demands, there are 
multiple and sometimes contradictory relationships between global and 
more local efforts to promote women's rights. For example, local 
women's advocacy groups in Nigeria and an international NGO, Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws, asked Amnesty International and other 
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international human rights organizations to stop petitioning Nigerian 
government officials in the infamous "stoning" cases in 2002-3 (Imam 
and Medar-Gould 2003). International petitions angered local officials 
and gave many Nigerians the impression that local attempts to bring due 
process to the zina cases masked secular interests. Scholars have discussed 
similar cases where Western intelVention resulted in unintended, 
negative consequences (see Farrell and McDermott 2005 on the 
Feminist Majority in Afghanistan). 
We do not wish to perpetuate a dichotomy between 'Western" and 
"African" women's rights activists because activists within a single 
country or world region are not uniformly alike. There are many kinds of 
feminisms at the local, national, and global levels (Basu 1995). Nor do 
we wish to portray the relationships between networks as static, zero-sum, 
or unidirectional. Regional advocacy networks may collaborate well with 
Western-based networks. Actors in regional networks may feel at the 
same time that they benefit and suffer from the efforts of other actors and 
networks. Several scholars have already articulated these points well 
(Narayan 1997; Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001), recognition of 
which could better inform research on transnational activism. 
In contrast to perspectives that emphasize the subjugation of non-
Westerners under a global "legal orthodoxy" (Dezalay and Garth 2002), 
we believe that activists in developing countries adopt legal advocacy 
tactics based on their own situations and beliefS. Women's activists in 
developing countries are not just norm takers but are proactive agents 
responding to local and global contexts. Women's activists within a single 
world region might perceive common challenges for changing women's 
lives, creating a starting point for cross-national collaboration. For example, 
Susanna Wing (2002) echoes a point commonly made on women's 
activists in Africa when she notes that Malian women are criticized as 
'Westernized" by their compatriots for mentioning the UN Conference on 
Women in Beijing. Such criticisms have led many women's rights activists 
to reconsider the usefulness of drawing on Western or "global" norms. 
Conditions for RAN Influence 
Of several important questions that could be asked about regional advocacy 
(see the conclusion), we focus on the question of the conditions under 
which RANs are likely to exert influence. Research on transnational 
mobilization employs the concept of political opportunity structure from 
social movement theory (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker 
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and Sikkink 2002; Joachim 2003), which we adopt here. In general, 
changes in opportunity structures can account for movement outcomes 
over time and space (McAdam 1996, 27). 
One aspect of the political opportunity structure is the relative openness 
of the political system. The importance of access for nonstate actors has 
been noted in international relations scholarship. Research on the UN's 
involvement in the advancement of women consistently points to the 
importance of women's NCO access to UN structures (Clark, Friedman, 
and Hochstetler 1998; Winslow 1995). Within international 
organizations, non state actors' ability to participate, determined by 
official and unofficial rules, can be crucial. Alliances with powerful 
leaders are a second important aspect of political opportunity (McAdam 
1996). Alliances may help outsiders get specific issues on the agenda at 
international meetings. The presence of alliances may be observed by 
matching the rhetoric of leaders with that of issue-based advocates. 
The presence of alliances may also be discovered by examining which 
countries propose treaty promulgation, amendment, and adoption. 
Social movement scholars identify the stability of elite alignments as a 
third aspect of the political opportunity structure. Shifting alliances 
among elites may provide networks the chance to gain leverage. 
Relatedly, state actors' unfamiliarity with the issues at hand may create a 
window of opportunity for nonstate actors. Fourth, institutional priorities 
and rules also affect the political opportunity structure. Sylvia Walby 
(2004) argues that the European Union (EU) privileges economic issues 
and intra-European integration processes, which creates both openings 
and barriers for activists. The AU, in contrast, has placed greater 
emphasis on peace, security, and development. 
Thus, there are four hypothesized conditions for RAN impact: 
l. improved access to the target institution will increase the likelihood of RAN 
success, 
2. alliances with key leaders will increase the likelihood of RAN success, 
3. shifting alliances among elites will improve chances for success, and 
4. shifting institutional priorities will help improve the likelihood of success. 
EXPWRATORY CASE STUDY AND DATA 
In the next section, we use the case of the Protocol on the Rights of Women 
in Africa to explore the plausibility of these hypothesized conditions for 
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success. As we analyze a single case, any conclusions will be suggestive rather 
than dispositive. Nevertheless, a single case study allows us to trace carefully 
the process in which RANs seek to influence politics. Primary source 
documents from the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/AU and the 
NCOs involved in the campaign serve as the main sources of data for the 
study. These documents include multiple drafts of the Protocol and 
markups of dmft texts from NCO meetings; OAU and AU reports from 
experts' and ministerial meetings on the Protocol; transcripts of speeches 
given at AU- and NGO-sponsored conferences; and reports from NGO 
meetings. We use these documents to trace the development of the 
Protocol and to tease out whether and how African women's organizations 
influenced the text. 
We supplement our analysis of primary source materials with data from 
10 semistructured interviews with representatives of women's organizations 
involved in the process. Five respondents respresenting four organizations 
were directly involved in the RAN (the African Women's Development and 
Communication Network [FEMNET1, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers 
Association [EWIA1, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional 
Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children [lAC], and the 
African Women's Committee on Peace and Development [AWCPD]). 
Four respondents included staff at the Economic Commission for 
Africa's (ECA) African Center for Gender and Development, staff at the 
AU's Gender Directorate, and a former representative to the Pan-African 
Parliament (see Appendix). The interviews, nine of which were 
conducted in the summer of 2005 in Addis Ababa and one of which was 
conducted in the summer of 2006 in Washington, D.C., though small 
in number, enabled us to check the inferences made from the analysis of 
documents with actors involved in the process. The interviews were 
conducted in English. Most interviews lasted about one hour. To meet 
Institutional Review Board requirements, respondents cannot be 
identified by name or in a way that compromises their anonymity. We 
also draw on informal discussions with AU staff and representatives of 
women's organizations and on secondary source material. 
THE CREATION OF THE PROfOCOL ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
IN AFRICA 
In this article, we seek to identify what RANs are and to shed light on the 
conditions under which they are likely to be influential. The first part of the 
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case study examines the process in which the Protocol was created. It then 
discusses the RAN's influence on the African Union. The last part of the 
case study assesses the hypothesized conditions for network influence 
and analyzes which conditions were crucial for RAN influence. 
The AU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa on July 11, 2003.2 The document covers 
many women's human rights issues discussed in CEDAWand in the 
Beijing Platform for Action but, unlike these international documents, 
the Protocol also reflects specific forms of violations found in parts of 
Africa. The 32 articles cover political, economic, and cultural rights 
and address such topics as discrimination, harmful practices, marriage, 
protection of women in armed conflicts, and health and reproductive 
rights. Supplementing the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, the Protocol entered into force on November 25, 2005, 30 days 
after the deposit of the fIfteenth instrument of ratification. As of March 
2007, 20 countries had ratified the Protocol,3 
It took eight years and the sustained attention of a RAN to move from the 
initial idea of a Protocol to its formal adoption. The RAN brought together 
lawyers, development experts, and human rights activists who sought to 
create a regional human rights document that explicitly addressed women's 
rights, reached or exceeded existing international norms, and specifically 
dealt with issues faced by women in Africa. Regional organizations in the 
RAN included the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children (lAC). The lAC is a group 
of 28 national NGOs whose regional office is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Another important member of the RAN was the African Women's 
Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), which has 
national focal points in 22 African countries and a secretariat in Nairobi, 
Kenya. A key early contributing member of the RAN was Women in Law 
and Development in Africa (WilDAF). WilDAF has a regional office in 
Harare, Zimbabwe, and has contacts in 31 African states. National 
organizations like the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWlA) and 
the Foundation for Community Development (FDC), which are based in 
a single country but are concerned with broader regional issues, also 
participated. Other critical members of the RAN, including Femmes Africa 
2. Throughout the narrative, we refer to the OAU before July 2002 and to the AU after July 2002. 
3. They include Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Cambia, Lesotho, Lih}a, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, and 
Zambia (African Union n.d.). 
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Solidarite (FAS) and Equality Now, were international NGOs that operate at 
both the global and regional levels. 
The seeds of the Protocol were planted at a March 1995 brainstonning 
seminar that brought together the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) - an intergovernmental organization within 
the OAU/AU established by the African Charter on Human and People's 
Rights - and various NGOs that would eventually crystallize into the 
more cohesive RAN. The seminar was jointly sponsored by the ACHPR 
and WilDAF'. Forty-four participants came together at the seminar to 
discuss the need to make the African Charter "more responsive" to 
women's rights (WilDAF' n.d.). Representatives of WilDAF' and other 
women's rights organizations argued that the African Charter was 
insufficient and affected women in contradictory ways (interview with 
Melinda Adams, Addis Ababa, July 15, 2005; Wandia 2004). They 
highlighted, for example, the fact that although Article 18(3) states that 
"the State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against 
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the 
child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions," the 
Article immediately preceding it could be used to limit the protection of 
women's rights (OAU 1981). Article 18(2) notes that "the State shall have 
the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognized by the community" (OAU 1981). 
Participants claimed that the Charter's respect for traditional values could 
be used as a basis for justifying the continuation of harmful traditional 
practices, such as female genital cutting, widowhood rites, and 
scarification. From the Protocol's inception, regional activists played a 
critical role in advocating for a women's human rights document. 
Although an initial draft of the Protocol was submitted to the OAU in 
November 1999, it was not until two years later that an OAU experts' 
meeting was held to discuss it (African Union 2002). These delays were 
partly a result of the transition from the OAU to the AU, which was 
marked by high levels of staff turnover. The OAU's first experts' meeting 
was held in November 2001 in Addis Ababa. Representatives of 
governments and civil society examined and commented on 27 articles. 
Participants included official government representatives selected by 
OAU / AU member states and representatives of organizations that had 
OAU / AU observer status. The latter could observe but not participate in 
the meeting's proceedings. Several members of the RAN, including 
Equality Now, EWLA, FAS, FEMNET, lAC, and WiLDAF, participated 
as observers. At the end of the 2001 experts' meeting, participants 
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reached agreement on all but three articles. Article 6(c), which addressed 
polygamy, Article 22, which discussed monitoring, and Article 26.5, 
which covered the process for amending and revising the Protocol, were 
bracketed for further discussion (OAU 2001). 
In 2002, the OAU scheduled a second experts' meeting and a ministerial 
meeting. It was forced to postpone them, however, due to lack of a quorum. 
The delay meant that the Protocol could not be placed on the agenda of the 
inaugural AU summit in Durban in July 2002. Three members of the 
RAN, the AWCPD, FAS, and the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), organized a meeting in Durban in 
June 2002 to discuss the delay. This meeting resulted in the Durban 
Declaration, which called on the AU to ensure the effective participation 
of government experts - including women - in the second experts' 
meeting, and to undertake "expedient adoption, ratification and 
enforcement of the Draft Protocol"; the Durban Dec1amtion further 
recommended that the AU take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate 
ministers were able to participate in the scheduled ministerial meeting and 
that the Protocol conformed to existing regional and international standards 
on women's human rights (AWCPD 2002). Members of the RAN then 
circulated the Durban Dec1amtion at the inauguml AU summit. 
Concerned about continuing delays and weaknesses in the draft 
document, Equality Now, FEMNET, and EWIA organized a meeting in 
Addis Ababa in January 2003 that brought together representatives of a 
number of African women's rights organizations to mark up the draft 
Protocol and to discuss how to encourage a quorum at the expert and 
ministerial meetings. Organizations who were present for this collective 
rnarkup included the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights 
Studies (ACDHRS), Akina Marna Wa Africa, the Association of Malian 
Women Lawyers (AJM), the Association of Senegalese Lawyers (A]S), 
Equality Now, EWLA, FAS, FEMNET, WilDAF, and Women's Rights 
Advancement and Protection Agency (WRAPA). Equality Now played a 
key role in coordinating the review of the document and in lobbying the 
AU to hold the experts' meeting and to involve the RAN in the process 
(Equality Now 2003, 7). Following the meeting, representatives of the 
RAN met with AU officials, urging them to organize meetings in March 
2003, and lobbied ministries of justice and gender to ensure that the 
meetings reached a quorum. In March 2003, a second experts' meeting 
was finally held, which was immediately followed by a ministerial meeting 
(African Union 2003a). Once again, African women's organizations, led 
by F AS, convened a presummit meeting to develop an advocacy strategy 
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and to lobby representatives of states and the AU during the second experts' 
meeting. 
The RAN's presummit meeting concluded with a reception for experts, 
which provided activists with an opportunity to talk with them informally 
immediately before the experts' and ministerial meetings. Members of the 
RAN attended these meetings as observers and additionally lobbied AU 
officials to strengthen the Protocol and to ensure that it was in line with 
existing international standards. The ministers approved the draft Protocol 
and passed it on to the Executive Council and finally to the AU Assembly. 
It was then formally adopted by the Assembly Heads of State in July 2003 
(African Union 2003b, 2003c). The RAN was pleased with the final 
document. Equality Now's Faiza Jama Mohamed, for example, stated that 
"the adoption of this Protocol marks a significant step forward in promoting 
the rights of women within Africa and we hope lays the groundwork for 
further gains for all women around the world" (Equality Now 2003, 7). 
REGIONAL NE1WORKS' INFLUENCE ON THE PROTOCOL 
While it could be suggested that AU member states and international 
donors made the Protocol on the Rights of Women possible, the case 
study shows that the women's rights RAN succeeded in creating and 
influencing this sweeping document. More specifically, success involves 
influence over several stages of policy activity. As Keck and Sikkink 
(1998, 25) note, networks can influence 1) issue creation and agenda 
setting, 2) institutional procedures, 3) policy change, 4) the discursive 
positions of states and organizations, and 5) state behavior. The women's 
rights RAN to date has exerted influence in the first four of these five stages. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the RAN was an early player in calling 
attention to the need for a regional women's rights document. But the RAN 
did more than raise the issue; it also made sure that the issue stayed on the 
AU's agenda during a period of institutional change marked by significant 
staff turnover and a large number of policy initiatives in the new 
organization. The instability of DAU/AU staff made the RAN's role more 
important, as members of the RAN provided continuity and support for 
overburdened members of the Gender Directorate. Throughout the delays 
that occurred during the transition, it was the RAN, not member states or 
Western actors, that pressured the AU to move ahead with the Protocol. 
The RAN not only influenced the DAU/AU's agenda but also affected 
its institutional procedures. From the beginning, the RAN pressured the 
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DAU to include nonstate actors in the working group that wrote the first 
draft of the Protocol. The RAN also lobbied for the inclusion of civil 
society organizations in experts' meetings. When nonstate actors could 
not officially participate in meetings, they attended as observers or, when 
that was not possible, held parallel presummit meetings that allowed 
them to lobby key state and regional decision makers. 
Close textual analysis suggests that the RAN played a critical role in 
shaping the content of the Protocol and in ensuring that it reached or 
surpassed existing international women's rights norms. Members of the 
RAN, including WiLDAF and the ACDHRS, were part of the initial 
working group that met several times in 1998 and 1999 to draft the first 
iteration of the Protocol, which was submitted to the DAU in 1999. At 
the January 2003 meeting organized by Equality Now, members of the 
RAN developed a collective markup of the Protocol, showing where it 
was weak and/or fell below international standards. Women's 
organizations had a direct impact on at least 12 articles. While 
definitions of violence against women and discrimination against women 
in the Protocol draw from UN women's rights treaties (Ebeku 2004), the 
provisions on abortion, contraception, and the rights of widows, the 
elderly, and disabled are innovative. Women's organizations suggested 
that member states should be required to enact and enforce laws to 
prohibit violence against women, which includes "unwanted or forced 
sex" (Article 4) (Equality Now 2003). This is in the final document but 
was not in the original November 1999 draft. The final version of the 
Protocol calls for the prohibition of all forms of female genital 
mutilation "through legislative measures backed by sanctions," whereas 
the 1999 version does not specifically require legal action (Article 5). 
The final version of Article 9 explicitly suggests that states use 
"affirmative action" to ensure equal opportunity for women in the 
political life of their countries. In addition to suggesting changes to 
existing clauses, women's organizations also added new clauses. 
Women's organizations inserted new clauses on equal representation and 
on the reform of discriminatory laws (Article 8). They also were in favor 
of adding five articles guaranteeing special provisions for widowed, 
elderly, and disabled women (Articles 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24) (Equality 
Now 2003). There is little evidence that member states or Western actors 
initiated these changes. 
The RAN's efforts to influence particular articles in the Protocol 
did encounter resistance. The RAN initially asked that the Protocol set 
restrictions on polygamy, but after two days of debates, the AU's experts 
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and women's rights activists came to a compromise and agreed on a clause 
stating that monogamy is the preferred form of marriage (Article 6[c]). 
Polygamy, and marriage more generally, is an issue that African women's 
rights activists have found particularly difficult to contest at the domestic 
level. In contrast, articles on improving women's political representation 
and guaranteeing rights to contraception and abortion were less 
controversial. The issues that most challenge women's rights activists on 
the continent are not necessarily the same issues that challenge women's 
rights activists in other world regions. 
The RAN not only influenced the Protocol but also targeted other 
issues in the AU. This broader work influenced the discursive positions 
of states and the AU on a wide array of gender equality issues. During 
the transition from the OAU to the AU, the RAN lobbied regional 
leaders to include a commitment to gender equality as a central 
principle in the AU's Constitutive Act (Article 4[1]). This commitment 
demonstrates the potential significance of discursive positions. Once 
leaders had enshrined gender equality as one of the AU's constitutive 
values, activists invoked Article 4( 1) of the Constitutive Act as they 
lobbied for specific policies. Using this tactic, activists won leaders' 
commitment to gender parity in AU decision-making positions, to a 
gender quota for delegations to the Pan-African Parliament, to the 
Protocol, and to the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. 
The Solemn Declaration, adopted by the AU Assembly in 2004, calls 
on states to submit annual reports on their progress toward achieving 
gender equality. It also requires the AU Commission to prepare a 
report each year describing progress made in this area at the national 
and regional levels. 
The RAN also influenced the discursive positions of specific states, 
pressuring them to adopt the Protocol, as well as other agreements such 
as the Solemn Declaration. Many of the organizations that participated 
in the RAN that pushed for the adoption of the Protocol fonned a 
coalition - Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR) - to 
pressure member states to ratify and implement it. To date, 43 countries 
have signed the Protocol and 20 have ratified it. For those states that have 
ratified the Protocol, it is a legally binding treaty. The reality, though, is 
that the Protocol has weak enforcement mechanisms, and state 
compliance is by no means guaranteed. Ratifying international 
documents does not necessarily change state behavior. It does, however, 
provide activists with standards to which they can seek to hold states 
accountable and may serve as a step toward changing state behavior. 
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CONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL NETWORK INFLUENCE 
The proceeding section outlined the RAN's impact in four stages of policy 
activity. The objective of this section is to explain how the RAN was able to 
have this influence, particularly as it had not been as successful in the past. 
Earlier, we hypothesized that the relative openness of the political system, 
alliances with powerful leaders, stability of elite alignments, and 
institutional priorities influence whether movements succeed or fail. In 
the case of the Protocol, we find that the political opportunity structure 
provided critical openings that activists effectively utilized to pressure 
states and the DAU / AU to adopt the Protocol. In particular, elite 
alliances, openings created by the transition from the DAU to the AU, 
and a close match between the RAN's goals and the AU's priorities 
contributed to the RAN's success. 
Political Alliances 
Activists fonned critical alliances with key African leaders, which played an 
important role in the RAN's success. Ambassadors, foreign ministers, and 
heads of state and government who draft and adopt AU policies are 
overwhelmingly men. The RAN, therefore, needed to identify leaders 
who would support women's rights at AU summits. Members of the 
RAN worked closely with regional opinion leaders, such as South 
Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, to achieve their 
goals. After attending the women's presummit meeting in Durban, for 
example, Wade proposed the gender parity provision that called for the 
selection of equal numbers of women and men to the AU Commission. 
Discussing Wade's role, a FAS publication noted that Wade "used his 
good offices to mobilize his peers to actively promote the objective of 
gender equality. As a result of his sensitive advocacy, the President did 
not face any opposition from other African leaders" (FAS 2004, 30). 
In 2003, Mbeki, who was then president of the AU, oversaw the election 
of equal numbers of women and men to the AU Commission and the 
adoption of the Protocol. At the 2004 summit, Mbeki called for 
the reintroduction of reporting mechanisms that had been dropped from 
the Solemn Declaration. 
Discussing the success of African women's networks in lobbying AU 
opinion leaders, a staff member of the EGA's African Center for Gender 
and Development noted: 
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It was because they were very astute. These are women who are very 
experienced, and they are politicians. They are politicians so they are 
strategic and they lobbied individuals and ... identified the key players 
among the heads of state, they identified them. They lobbied the 
Chairman and they lobbied the regional leaders, they lobbied the opinion 
makers in each region. They got their support of key people at the highest 
levels (interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 27, 2005). 
A fonner EWlA staff member similarly highlighted the importance of 
lobbying key players: 
At every summit, when women's groups go to AU summits and they lobby in 
the corridors, they lobby the ambassadors, they really made a lot of effort over 
several years and that backdoor lobbying, that backdoor advocacy, somehow 
delivered at the end of the day. And in fact this was initiated by the 
Senegalese president And in fact, you know, both were, the presidents 
who proposed and supported it, the Senegalese president and the South 
African president, they are also committed... But the thing is who 
initiated it and it has been, you know, it has been pushed by women, 
women's groups. But also this is not to minimize the credit that should be 
given to the heads of state (interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 25, 
2005).4 
Women's rights activists in the RAN sought out and gained the ears of 
individuals who had demonstrated a commitment to women's rights and 
whose opinions carried weight within the region. This slmtegy and 
collaboration represents a departure from the past where contact between 
women's rights activists and regional leaders was more limited. 
Openness of the Political System 
The transition from the DAU to the AU opened opportunities for changing 
institutional policies and nonns. Discussing why the AU has taken such a 
progressive stance on gender issues - at least at the policy level - a 
staff member at the AU's Gender Directorate compared the AU's progress 
on gender issues to that of South Africa and Rwanda (interview with 
Adams, Addis Ababa, July 19, 2005). The South African constitution is 
widely recognized as one of the most progressive in the world on gender 
equality. Currently, Rwanda has the highest percentage of female 
legislators in the world. Both countries achieved these changes following 
4. FAS awarded Wade and Mbeki the first African Gender Award in 2005 for their support of gender 
equity measures within the AU (FAS 2005). 
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conflict and regime change. Scholars have highlighted that political change 
has frequently provided openings for women to challenge patriarchal 
structures and to increase women's representation (e.g., Goetz and 
Hassim 2003; Seidman 1999; and Tripp 2003). Drawing on national 
experiences and women's success in demanding greater representation in 
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and elsewhere, activists 
took advantage of the transition from the DAU to the AU to secure 
greater commitments to women's rights. Activists emphasize that the 
creation of the AU was critical to the development of regional gender 
equity policies since it is easier to change norms and policies when 
institutional rules and practices are in flux. 
The decision to launch a new regional organization, which was 
announced in 1999 at an Extraordinary DAU Summit in Sitre, Libya, 
provided the RAN with an opening to push for a stronger commitment 
to gender equality. The 2002 Durban Declaration, for example, states 
that women's organizations were "convinced that African women must 
seize the opportunity provided by the historical moment of the 
launching of the African Union to ensure their full and effective 
participation in its operationalisation" (AWCPD 2002). In addition, 
proceedings from the 2003 presummit meeting in Maputo state that the 
transition from the DAU to the AU "provided the opportunity for 
women's organisations and networks to meet and discuss the pertinent 
issues facing gender and women on the Continent and to develop 
strategies and recommendations to address these issues within the newly 
formed structure" (FDC 2003). 
Institutional Priorities 
The compatibility of the RAN's goals and the AU's institutional priorities 
further contributed to the RAN's influence. The AU's desire to represent 
the people of the continent translated into policies that offered civil 
society greater input into AU policies. Discussing the more cooperative 
relationship between the AU and civil societal groups, a staff member at 
the lAC stated: 
The Gender Directorate invited civil society about a month and a half ago to 
input into this Solemn Declaration. African Heads of State made a Solemn 
Declaration supporting gender and we decided that if we just leave them 
after signing that paper, they are not likely to implement it. We'd better 
design guidelines for implementation for them and tools to monitor the 
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implementation. And [the 1 African Union invited civil society. We were part 
of that process to design guidelines to monitor Heads of State implementing 
the Solemn Declaration on gender. That is a change. That's a shift. The 
OAU probably would not have invited you. You had to push yourself into 
OAU. Remember we drafted a Convention and pushed ourselves into the 
mouth of OAU. But now the AU on their own does the invitation and the 
consultation with civil society. There is a great change. There is a great 
shift. They consult with us and they take what we have said into 
consideration. We sat with them deciding how to monitor. And that was a 
big thing. (Interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 15, 2005) 
The AU established a Gender Directorate that frequently holds 
consultations on AU gender policies and invites representatives of civil 
society to participate in these meetings. The Gender Directorate has also 
collaborated with NGOs to cosponsor conferences. The AU and 
SOAWR, for example, jointly sponsored a conference on the ratification 
and domestication of the Protocol in September 2005. Though Winnie 
Byanyima, the head of the AU's Gender Directorate, specifically refers to 
the Solemn Declaration, her comments are equally relevant to the 
Protocol: 
The third and last point I wish to stress is the critical role of civil society in 
this process. The SD is the labour oflove of African women's organisations. 
Women spent many years asking African leaders to address their concerns 
and to include them in decision-making. That is why in the first three ... 
years of its existence, the AU has made land-mark decisions that have 
made it a global leader in the promotion of gender equality. To maintain 
and even increase the momentum towards gender equality, civil society 
has to continue the critical role it has played in the past (Byanyima 2005). 
To distinguish itself from its predecessor and to demonstrate its 
commitment to representing the people of Africa rather than just its 
governments, the AU has sought to work more closely with civil society 
organizations and to improve its reputation on human rights. The goals 
of the RAN, therefore, overlapped with those of the AU, which 
enhanced the RAN's influence. 
Alternative narratives would suggest that member states and Western 
donors played a more important role than did the women's rights 
network and that international norms of women's rights were essential. 
Focusing solely on state actors does not explain the timing or the 
expansive content of the Protocol. Indeed, state representatives to the AU 
expressed reservations against several articles at the March 2003 
ministerial meeting. While the RAN received support from international 
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groups, such as the International Commission ofJurists, it was better placed 
to addresses controversial issues, such as polygamy, abortion, and female 
genital cutting, which pose difficulties for external activists accused of 
imposing "Western" values. Without the RAN, Western-based networks 
and international norms could not have gone very far. 
The question we have sought to answer is why the RAN was able to 
influence the creation of such a document. We argue that the political 
opportunity structure affects whether RANs will be influential. Specifically, 
the case study suggests that RANs will be influential when they have allies 
within states, when they have the ability to participate in the decision-
making processes of the institutions they seek to influence, and when their 
goals match with the target institution's priorities. In this case study, 
shifiing alliances among elites was not a significant factor. 
None of this would have mattered, however, if the RAN did not have 
strong national and regional women's organizations upon which to 
build. The existence of national-level women's organizations enabled the 
RAN to coalesce quickly to take advantage of the shifting opportunity 
structure. The case study suggests that a propitious political opportunity 
structure is important. For this to matter, though, actors must mobilize to 
seize these opportunities. This is a single case study, and its conclusions 
are suggestive. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: REGIONAL ADVOCACY 
BEYOND THE AFRICAN CASE 
This article has two major objectives. First, we suggest that regional 
advocacy networks (RAN s) are emerging as distinct, powerful players in 
contemporary world politics. Our focus on regional-level advocacy 
provides concrete causal linkages lacking in sociological institutionalist 
research and tackles the lack of research on non-Western actors in a fairly 
well-established literature on transnational activism. Second, we argue 
that activists within the African continent took advantage of a propitious 
political opportunity structure to pressure states to adopt the Protocol. 
The transition from the OAU to the AU provided activists the 
opportunity to push for stronger gender equality measures. RANs 
mobilized quickly following the announcement of the transition to 
secure a commitment to gender equality within the AU's Constitutive 
Act. They then drew on this commitment to pressure states to adopt 
specific gender equality measures such as the Protocol. The transition 
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also opened additional channels for nonstate actors to participate in 
regional decision making. 
The implications of this research go beyond the African context. A 
glance at various arenas of contemporary world politics shows that RAN s 
are emerging in different regions and under different regional 
opportunity structures. In Europe, a RAN campaigned for gender 
equality within the European Union by using access to EU institutions 
to expand gender equality rights. Although individuals do not have direct 
access to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a women's RAN works 
with domestic courts to refer gender equality cases to the ECJ (Tarrow 
2005, 152). This strategy has been quite effective: Between 1970 and the 
late 1990s, the ECJ reviewed 177 cases involving gender equality 
(Cichowski 2001, 122; Tarrow 2005, 153). 
In Latin America, women's activists have organized a series of informal, 
intraregional meetings called Encuentros (encounters), which bring 
together women to discuss the state of feminism and women's activism 
in the region. These meetings provide an opportunity for activists to 
participate in "periodic regional conversations" on such topics as the 
state of feminism in Latin America, the value of autonomy, and who 
should be allowed to participate in the meetings (Alvarez et al. 2003, 
540). In contrast with the meetings organized by African women's RANs, 
the focus of the Encuentros is not on influencing national and regional 
policies. 
A RAN in Latin America also contributed to the adoption of the 1994 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women. The Convention has raised awareness about violence 
against women and prompted the revision and adoption of national laws. 
At the same time, there is little data that indicates that domestic violence 
is actually declining in Latin America. Moreover, "some countries of the 
region have treated the ratification of the Convention as a 'destination' 
and not as a 'point of departure'" (Inter-American Commission of 
Women 2001, 18). The Convention demonstrates some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of regional women's rights documents and highlights 
that adoption and ratification are just two steps in a long process of 
changing behaviors. 
Future research can more fully interrogate why RANs emerge when they 
do and whether regional networks help countries comply with women's 
rights agreements and domestic policies on women's rights. This will 
necessitate a closer and more systematic examination of the relationships 
among domestic state policies, national women's organizations, and 
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regional advocacy networks. Nevertheless, our article demonstrates the 
importance of a regional advocacy network in directing regional-level 
awareness of women's rights. Women's advocates in Africa and elsewhere 
are trying a new strategy: In addition to domesticating international 
norms, they are regionalizing them. 
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